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“MR. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE: WHOM 
WOULD YOU NOMINATE?” 
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Mitu Gulati* 
Presidential candidates compete on multiple fronts for votes.  Who is 
more likeable?  Who will negotiate more effectively with allies and 
adversaries?  Who has the better vice-presidential running mate?  Who 
will make better appointments to the Supreme Court and the cabinet?  
This last question is often discussed long before the inauguration, for 
the impact of a secretary of state or a Supreme Court justice can be 
tremendous.  Despite the importance of such appointments, we do not 
expect candidates to compete on naming the better slates of nominees.  
For the candidates themselves,  avoiding competition over nominees in 
the pre-election context has personal benefits—in particular, enabling 
them to keep a variety of supporters working hard on the campaign in 
the hope of being chosen as nominees.  But from a social perspective, 
this norm has costs.  This Article proposes that candidates be induced 
out of the status quo.  In the current era of candidates responding to 
internet queries and members of the public asking questions via 
YouTube, it is plausible that the question—“Whom would you nominate 
(as secretary of state or for the Supreme Court)?”—might be asked in a 
public setting.  If one candidate is behind in the race, he can be pushed 
to answer the question—and perhaps increase his chances of winning 
the election. 
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Let him say not one single word about his principles, or his creed—let 
him say nothing—promise nothing.  Let no Committee, no convention—
no town meeting ever extract from him a single word, about what he 
thinks now, or what he will do hereafter.  Let the use of pen and ink be 
wholly forbidden as if he were a mad poet in Bedlam. 
—Advice that Nicholas Biddle, the manager of William Henry 
Harrison’s successful 1840 campaign for the presidency, reportedly 
gave the presidential candidate.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION: NAMING NAMES 
Imagine that it is fall 2012.  Mitt Romney, the Republican 
challenger for the presidency, has been four to eight points behind 
President Barack Obama in every poll for the last five months, 
except for a small post-convention bounce for Romney that soon 
dissipated.  If Romney does not do something to change the dynamic 
of the presidential race, he will lose.  One of his advisers suggests 
that Romney announce who his top cabinet members will be and/or 
whom he plans to nominate to the Supreme Court.  If he proposes 
one or more nominees who appeal to a key constituency, then he 
might attract enough of those voters to help him in the general 
election.  This move involves risks.  Some voters will be 
disappointed because their favored cabinet and Court candidates 
were not selected.  But Romney is behind in the polls and is looking 
for a strategy that might turn things around.  If the odds are that he is 
going to lose anyway, why not name names? 
Presidential candidates inevitably claim that they will nominate 
better people than their competition will.  But they are rarely pushed 
to name names prior to the election.  When the matter of naming 
names comes up, candidates sidestep.  For example, during the 2008 
election, Obama said, “I don’t want to tip my hand” by naming 
possible nominees for the Supreme Court.2  Instead, he explained that 
he wanted justices who would “follow . . . clear legal precedent,” 
“stop giving the executive branch carte blanche” to do whatever it 
wants, and, where the law was unclear, consider the interests of 
 
 1. Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 
66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 555, 555 (1972) (quoting NICHOLAS BIDDLE, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF 
NICHOLAS BIDDLE 256 (R.C. McGrane ed., Houghton Mifflin 1919)). 
 2. See Videotape: Obama’s “Philosophy about the Supreme Court,” available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PACfWBUY3mA (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). 
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“those who are vulnerable in our political system.”3  On a separate 
occasion, he announced that he wanted justices who would have 
“empathy.”4  In sum, he provided little more than vague generalities 
as to who his justices were likely to be, even though the implicit 
suggestion in his “I don’t want to tip my hand” statement was that he 
and his advisers had already thought about potential Supreme Court 
nominees.    There may have been personal benefits to Obama from 
not “tipping his hand.”  Most notably, he could keep a variety of his 
supporters working hard on his campaign in the hope of being chosen 
as nominees.  But the benefits to society of candidates being forced 
to show their cards prior to the election may be greater still.  
It is trite to say that the current system of presidential 
nominations is flawed.  The question is how to make it better.  For 
those of us who have no direct power to effectuate change, the 
solution has to be one that can be achieved without the need for 
resources, votes, lobbyists, and the like.  The idea will strike many as 
nutty.  But asking candidates to name names may yield real answers, 
and the process of asking and answering may produce change.5 
Our hope is to induce competition between the presidential 
candidates over who would choose the better nominees.  There are 
barriers to inducing this competition.  But they might be 
surmountable when one candidate is significantly behind in the polls 
and is willing to take some risks.  The key is to consider how pre-
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Carrie Dann, Obama on Judges, Supreme Court, MSNBC, July 17, 2007, 
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/07/17/274143.aspx.  Perhaps the most specific 
Obama got was during one of the debates when, in response to a question about the kinds of 
people he would appoint to the Court, he said that he would seek “people who have life 
experience and they understand what it means to be on the outside, what it means to have the 
system not work for them . . . .”  Transcript: The Democratic Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/us/politics/15debate-transcript.html 
?partner=permalink&exprod=permalink (citing the Federal News Service). 
 5. A few people have made similar suggestions in recent years via blog posts and an op-ed, 
but there has been no extended discussion of the idea.  See Chris Sprigman, Op-Ed., Ministers 
Without Portfolio (Yet), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, at A23 (suggesting that John Kerry name a 
shadow cabinet); James Boyce, Barack and His Shadow: Should He Appoint a Shadow Cabinet 
Now?, HUFFINGTON POST, May 29, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyce/barack-
and-his-shadow-sho_b_104035.html; Matthew Yglesias, Shadow Cabinet, THEATLANTIC.COM, 
July 16, 2004, http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2004/07/shadow_cabinet.php.  
Part of the reason for the lack of discussion about potential cabinet members may be the belief 
that such an announcement would be illegal.  As we discuss below, there is indeed a federal 
statute that could be read to prohibit such an announcement, but such an application would clearly 
violate the First Amendment.  See infra Part V.A. 
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election choices might differ from what we would expect from that 
same president once elected.  For instance, we might move from the 
current state in which Supreme Court nominees are usually young 
federal appeals court judges with uncontroversial publication 
records, to a model of older and more interesting non-judges. 
II.  THE STATUS QUO AND ITS DRAWBACKS 
A.  The Status Quo 
Presidential candidates choose and announce their choice for 
vice president in advance, and usually perceive the choice as one that 
can help them in the election.  But the tradition is not to name 
anyone else.  In contrast, Britain has a tradition of “shadow 
governments,” in which the party out of power has an entire cabinet 
of alternative (or “shadow”) ministers who are generally expected to 
take on those same roles if their party comes to power.6  Voters thus 
have a sense not only of the Prime Minister they are potentially 
electing but also of the ministers who will serve in the cabinet. 
Candidates sometimes say that they would select justices “like” 
certain sitting justices.  George W. Bush promised to select justices 
like Antonin Scalia.7  Similarly, John McCain said that John Roberts 
and Samuel Alito “would serve as the model for my own nominees.”8  
Meanwhile, candidates sometimes give hints about whom they 
would consider for cabinet positions.  For example, it was widely 
believed that Thomas Dewey was going to choose John Foster Dulles 
as his secretary of state in 1948.9  But presidential candidates have 
not publicly promised that they will choose X, Y, or Z.10 
 
 6. E.g., RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH 
GOVERNMENT 171–81 (1999). 
 7. See Fred Barnes, Bush Scalia, WEEKLY STANDARD, July 5, 1999, at 16. 
 8. Dana Bash, Bush Nominates Alito to Supreme Court: Conservatives, Liberals Ready for 
Heated Debate, CNN.COM, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/ 
scotus.bush/index.html; Libby Quaid, McCain Castigates Obama on Judges, LAW.COM, May 6, 
2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202421162864. 
 9. See John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Arlington National Cemetery, 
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jfdulles.htm (“It was generally believed that Mr. Dulles would 
have been Secretary of State if Mr. Dewey had won, but Harry S. Truman was the surprise 
victor.”). 
 10. Candidate George W. Bush, for example, intimated that he would name Colin Powell as 
his Secretary of State.  See Jamie McIntyre, Secretary Powell? Bush Hints at Former General’s 
Role, CNN.COM, Aug. 1, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/08/01/ 
powell.state/index.html. 
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B.  Problems with the Status Quo 
Only after they are elected do presidents identify their cabinet 
choices and (with luck) eventually a few Supreme Court nominees.  
The president’s incentives at this stage are not to win votes—he 
already did that.11  Now, the incentives are a combination of wanting 
to perpetuate his legacy well beyond his time, to pay back political 
favors from the election, and to protect against the Senate 
undermining his nominee. 
A president’s choices often give rise to complaints involving 
surprise and the qualifications of nominees.12  As to the former, 
critics might say that the president is not nominating the sort of 
people whom he indicated he would nominate when he was a 
candidate.  As to the latter, the complaints involving cabinet 
members might focus on the perceived inexperience of some 
nominees.  Relatedly, there is often suspicion that these nominations 
are a form of patronage.13  The complaints involving Supreme Court 
justices often involve their ideology as well as their youth, since 
presidents have an incentive to nominate relative youngsters to the 
bench in the hope that they will have long careers and thus extend 
presidential legacies. 
1.  Supreme Court Nominees 
Before the election, presidential candidates are primarily 
concerned about winning.  Pre-election, the matter of creating a 
legacy is a back-burner issue, if one at all.  After the election, legacy 
creation moves to the front burner.  Presidents have an interest in 
nominating justices who are as young as possible.  This interest 
flows from a particular exception: the United States is one of the 
only nations that has neither a retirement age nor a term limit for the 
members of its highest court.14 
 
 11. A newly elected President likely hopes to be reelected, but he would also know that re-
election was sufficiently far away that his initial choice of cabinet and Supreme Court nominees 
would have a fairly attenuated effect on the election four years hence. 
 12. See Richard W. Stevenson, When a President Is Not Spoiling for a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4 2005, at A24. 
 13. See Posting of Dr. Denny, Bush’s Patronage Appointments to Ambassador Exceeds 
Father’s, Clinton’s, to ScholarsandRogues.wordpress.com, (June 25, 2007), http://www.scholars 
androgues.com/2007/06/25/bushs-patronage-appointments-to-ambassador-exceed-fathers-clinto 
ns/#more-917. 
 14. For an international comparison, see Reed Watson & Matthew W. Wolfe, Comparing 
Judicial Compensation: Apples, Oranges and Cherry-Picking (Apr. 24, 2008) (unpublished 
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So a president seeking to maximize the impact of his 
appointments (and why shouldn’t he?) has an interest in appointing 
justices who have many years to live.  Unsurprisingly, in light of this 
incentive, most recent Supreme Court nominees have been fifty-five 
or younger, and Clarence Thomas was forty-three.15  On the flip side, 
judges in their sixties, like J. Harvie Wilkinson or Richard Posner, 
are considered too old to be appointed to the Court—and not because 
of any diminishment in their judging intellect.  Most experts would 
likely say that a person with a longer career and the varied 
experiences that go along with it would be a preferable choice for a 
justice, because such a person would exercise better judgment.16  In 
addition, commentators have expressed concern about the 
entrenchment that young appointments can entail, delaying for years 
the impact of changes in the popular will.17 
A different complaint is more specific to recent Supreme Court 
nomination trends: the absence of political experience among its 
members.18  This is probably the starkest discontinuity between the 
current Supreme Court and its predecessors.  For the first time in 
history, no justice of the Supreme Court has ever served in any 
legislature or ever held (or even run for) any elective public office.19  
 
abstract, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106244).  Even within 
the United States, few of the individual states allow for life appointments.  See Stephen J. Choi, 
G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for 
an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary (U. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ. Program Working 
Paper No. 357, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008989. 
 15. See Findlaw Supreme Court Center: Supreme Court: Present Justices, http:// 
supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/justices/presjustices.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) 
(eight of the nine Justices on the current Supreme Court were fifty-five or younger when 
nominated; Ruth Bader Ginsburg is the exception). 
 16. See generally Gregory A. Caldeira, In the Mirror of the Justices: Sources of Greatness 
on the Supreme Court, 10 POL. BEHAVIOR 247, 247 (1988). 
 17. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON & ROGER C. CRAMTON, REFORMING THE COURT: TERM 
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2005).  It is remarkable that, decades after every other 
Gerald Ford appointee has left office, John Stevens remains in office—or that the person Stevens 
replaced (William O. Douglas) stepped down in the Ford administration after having been 
nominated in the middle of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration.  See SUPREME COURT OF 
THE U.S., MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supreme 
courtus.gov/about/members.pdf. 
 18. See Norman Dorsen, The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
652, 663, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1098743. 
 19. See Timothy P. O’Neill, “The Stepford Justices”: The Need for Experiential Diversity 
on the Roberts Court, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 702 (2007) (noting these facts, along with the fact 
that “[f]or the first time in history every justice had been a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals at 
the time of appointment to the Supreme Court.”); Dorsen, supra note 18, at 663.  David Souter 
was Attorney General of New Hampshire for two years, but he was appointed to that position 
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The Court has but two members who served as high-level members 
of the executive branch, and neither was in the cabinet or was 
otherwise a significant political figure.20  Scholars have noted the 
break with historical practice.21  Through most of its history, the 
Court had several members who were important political figures 
before they joined the Court—senators (e.g., Hugo Black), governors 
(e.g., Earl Warren), presidents or presidential candidates (e.g., 
William Howard Taft), members of the president’s cabinet (e.g., 
Robert H. Jackson), or all of the above (e.g., Salmon Chase, who was 
a senator, governor, presidential candidate, and cabinet member 
before he became chief justice).22 
Many note this development with chagrin.  They argue that the 
country would be better served if some Supreme Court justices had 
significant political experience.23  The cases before the Supreme 
Court often involve issues where knowledge of the political process 
would be helpful, e.g., cases where the exigencies of legislative or 
executive decision-making loom large.  Also, some have argued that 
serving on the Supreme Court involves more than adjudicating—that 
it is in part a policy-making position and that the experiences 
 
(and left it to become a judge).  See LII: US Supreme Court: Justice Souter, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/souter.bio.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). 
 20. We are defining “high level” as those who are confirmed by the Senate, which includes 
all executive officers under the Appointments Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  The two are 
Antonin Scalia (Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel) and Clarence Thomas 
(head of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).  Neither held a cabinet-level position, 
but both were Senate-confirmed.  See generally Oyez: Justices, http://www.oyez.org/justices/ 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2009). 
 21. See Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some 
Republican Supreme Court Justices ‘Evolve’ and Others Don’t? (Columbia Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 06-127), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=935129. 
 22. Stephen Maizlish, Salmon P. Chase: The Roots of Ambition and the Origins of Reform, 
18 J. EARLY REP. 1, 47–50 (1998); see Adam Liptak, Obama Has Chance to Select Justice With 
Varied Résumé, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A1 (“In 1946, for instance, eight of the nine justices 
had not been sitting judges when they were appointed. . . .  The justices who sat in 1946 . . . 
included two former attorneys general, two senators, a Treasury secretary, a chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and a law professor.”); see generally O’Neill, supra note 
19, at 727-31 (discussing backgrounds of the justices). 
 23. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial 
Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 903 (2003). 
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entailed in running for elective office (or at least serving as major 
appointed political officials) give justices a valuable perspective.24 
Our point is not to endorse this critique but to note that it, like 
many academic critiques, identifies a problem on which the public 
currently has no impact.  The president nominates and the Senate 
confirms.25  It is possible for a group of citizens to lobby the 
president to choose a particular Supreme Court nominee or lobby the 
Senate not to confirm a nominee who lacks significant political 
experience.  But it is hard to imagine any of the special interest 
groups that are capable of the necessary lobbying doing anything 
about this concern.  Their interests probably go in the reverse 
direction.  The trend toward nominating Supreme Court justices with 
little political experience has occurred alongside a rise in the 
lobbying of presidents and senators.26 
2.  Cabinet Nominations 
There is less commonality in the criticisms of the cabinet-
nomination process, but the two most common involve partisanship 
and qualifications.  George W. Bush’s first cabinet provides an 
example.  His campaign for the presidency emphasized that he was a 
moderate governor who often reached across the aisle and worked 
closely with Democrats.27  When he was elected president in the 
closest presidential election in American history, many expected that 
he would fill his cabinet with moderate cabinet members and a fair 
number of Democrats.  Instead, there was only one Democrat—the 
moderate to conservative Norman Mineta (and Mineta’s position, 
secretary of transportation, has traditionally been considered one of 
the least important cabinet positions).  Meanwhile, Bush appointed 
two politicians associated with the right wing of his party (John 
 
 24. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE 
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 259–64 (4th ed. 2005); O’Neill, supra note 19, at 722–34; see also 
Richard A. Posner, Foreward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 26. Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, The Road to Riches Is Called K Street: Lobbying Firms Hire More, 
Pay More, Charge More to Influence Government, WASH. POST, June 22, 2005, at A01 (reporting 
that between 2000 and 2005, the number of registered lobbyists doubled from 16,342 to 34,785); 
Opensecrets.org, Lobbying Database, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2009) (from 2000 to 2007 total lobbying spending increased from $1.54 billion to $2.81 
billion). 
 27. Alison Mitchell, The 2000 Campaign: The Texas Governor; Bush’s Bipartisanship 
Would Face Tough Test, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at A10. 
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Ashcroft and Donald Rumsfeld) to two of the most important cabinet 
positions (Attorney General and Secretary of Defense).28 
A parallel in the context of the 2008 election is that Barack 
Obama was rumored to be considering two Republicans, Chuck 
Hagel and Richard Lugar, for senior cabinet positions, in an attempt 
to win over voters from John McCain.29  Obama did not, however, 
announce that Hagel and Lugar were his top choices (although he 
was willing to say that they were possibilities, while at the same time 
widening the pool of possibilities to include even Arnold 
Schwarzenegger).30  In response to questions from The Sunday Times 
regarding his choice of cabinet, he was coy in saying “Chuck Hagel 
is a great friend of mine and I respect him very much.”31  Maybe we 
should not allow the candidates to escape with coyness and ask them 
for clarification.  Allowing them to escape with such answers gives 
them greater discretion, after the election, to forget their implicit pre-
election commitments to marginal voters and instead use the 
appointments to satisfy their core support groups. 
The example of George W. Bush’s cabinet appointments is 
interesting in that it stands in contrast to the example of Court 
appointments.  In the Court context, the absence of a pre-election 
competition over naming names seems to result in relatively young 
and middle-of-the-road appointments.  With the Bush Cabinet 
appointments discussed above, we did not see the same dynamic.  
Rumsfeld and Ashcroft were anything but middle-of-the-road or 
uncontroversial.  Nor were they particularly youthful.  The different 
dynamic is due in part to the fact that cabinet members are not 
appointed for life, unlike Supreme Court members.  Because cabinet 
members serve no longer than the president and are understood to be 
political, senators have historically been more willing to confirm 
partisan cabinet members.32  It is hard to imagine any Supreme Court 
 
 28. The “big four” departments are traditionally regarded as the Departments of Justice, 
Defense, Treasury, and State.  See David Greenberg, The Sorry Lot of a Bush Cabinet Secretary, 
SLATE, Nov. 22, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2110032/. 
 29. See Sarah Baxter, Barnstorming Obama Plans to Pick Republicans for Cabinet, SUNDAY 
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_ 
americas/us_elections/article3466823.ece. 
 30. See Posting of Sunlen Miller to blogs.abcnews.com, http://blogs.abcnews.com/ 
politicalradar/2007/12/obama-says-hed.html (Dec. 20, 2007, 08:29 EST). 
 31. Baxter, supra note 29. 
 32. United States Senate, Nominations, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/com 
mon/briefing/Nominations.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
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nominee openly averring that she was a partisan Democrat or 
Republican, whereas such partisanship is common for cabinet 
appointees.33 
The result is that the political dynamics surrounding Supreme 
Court and cabinet appointments diverge.  But for both kinds of 
appointments, the pre- and post-election nomination considerations 
might be quite different.  In each case, we should expect that pre-
election choices would be different from Supreme Court and cabinet 
members chosen post-election.  Had there been an explicit pre-
election competition in naming names—in which Bush and Gore 
named their top choices in the pre-election context—polarizing 
figures like Rumsfeld and Ashcroft might not have gotten the nod.  
Their appointments, after the election, were perhaps paybacks to 
Bush’s core constituency.  Had there been a pre-election 
competition, the focus might have been on capturing the votes of 
those in the middle to whom Rumsfeld and Ashcroft would not have 
appealed. 
III.  WHY ANSWER? 
The convention against announcing selections may seem natural, 
given that it has existed for many years.  But it might not be that 
difficult to change.  If we simply asked presidential nominees to tell 
us whom they would nominate for the Supreme Court and their 
cabinet before we voted for them, they might answer.  The paradigm 
for our thinking about this Article was the CNN/YouTube video 
questions asked of the candidates during the 2008 primary 
campaign.34  That process enabled individual citizens to ask the 
candidates direct questions, as they do in “town hall” meetings with 
candidates. 
Why would a candidate answer such a question?  The naysayers 
will explain that answering—naming specific names—would so 
constrain the presidential candidate and be so risky that no candidate 
would do it.  Those answers are too simple. 
The observation that candidates for political office prefer to 
make vague pronouncements rather than specific ones is not new.  
 
 33. Id. 
 34. CNN/YouTube Democratic Debate: Complete Video, http://www.cnn.com/2007/ 
POLITICS/07/24/youtube.debate.video/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008). 
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Scholars have posited explanations for the preference for 
obfuscation, grounded in the proposition that candidates have more 
to lose than to gain by being specific.35  Our goal is not to take issue 
with those positive analyses of political behavior.  Rather, it is to ask 
whether there are circumstances under which the presidential 
candidates might be willing (with inducement, if necessary) to be 
more specific.  After all, candidates sometimes are willing to take 
risks in an attempt to change the dynamics of a race they seem to be 
losing.36 
The circumstance we have in mind is where one candidate is 
significantly behind in the polls and can identify an important voting 
group with many members who are leaning toward his opponent (or 
toward staying home on election day) but are potentially movable.  
The voting group, let us say, is not convinced that the candidate who 
is behind really shares their values.  The candidate can say that he 
shares their values, but talk is cheap.  Vague promises are not going 
to help persuade voters who are on the fence or leaning away; they 
are already skeptical.37  The candidate can promise to enact policies 
they favor.  But the candidate can also tell them that he will nominate 
a person whom they know to favor their positions, and that could be 
valuable to those voters.  It will be particularly valuable insofar as it 
is harder to wriggle out of those promises.  A candidate who 
promises to appoint justices like Scalia and Thomas might be able to 
claim that Harriet Miers fits the bill.  A candidate who promises to 
appoint either John Roberts, Sam Alito, or Mike Luttig cannot make 
the same claim about Miers. 
A related response is that not enough voters will care who the 
appointees are, and thus presidential candidates will not see any 
benefit in naming names.  It is true, for example, that vice-
 
 35. See Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, The Politics of Ambiguity, 105 Q. J. ECON. 829 
(1990); Benjamin I. Page, The Theory of Political Ambiguity, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 742 (1976); 
Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 555 (1972).  Although much of the scholarship on the politics of ambiguity is in 
political science, legal scholars have also discussed the question in the context of Congress 
passing ambiguous legislation.  See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default 
Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663 (2004). 
 36. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, A Scrappy Fighter, McCain Honed His Debating Style In 
and Out of Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A25. 
 37. Cf. Harris Delles & Vally Koubi, Smoke Screen: A Theoretical Framework, 78 PUB. 
CHOICE 351 (1994) (smokescreens work better as a strategy for political candidates when they 
already have a high reputation and the voters in question are not particularly discerning). 
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presidential choices generally do not change a significant percentage 
of voters in the national electorate.38  But vice presidents can help the 
ticket in one or more important states (e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
presence on the ticket was crucial for John F. Kennedy carrying 
Texas, in what turned out to be a very close election).39  And though 
Sarah Palin was not able to swing the 2008 election in John 
McCain’s favor, she helped energize the conservative base in a way 
that McCain had not been able to do on his own.40  Only a small 
percentage of voters will change their votes based on who the 
secretary of the treasury or chief justice will be, just as a small 
number will change their votes based on a candidate’s position on 
NAFTA41 or the estate tax.42  But those small numbers can be game-
changers in an election. 
Most sports fans are knowledgeable about more than one player 
on a given team.  For better or worse, we do not expect most voters 
to be as knowledgeable about the president’s team as they are about 
their favorite sports teams, but the relevant threshold is not a 
majority of voters.  The question is whether an electorally significant 
 
 38. Polling data show that, among recent vice presidents, Dan Quayle is the only one whose 
presence on the ticket appears to have changed the votes of more than 1 percent of voters—in his 
case away from the ticket.  See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 913, 926 (1992).  The impact of Sarah Palin on the outcome of the 2008 election is less 
clear, see infra note 40, but CNN’s exit poll found that a remarkable 7 percent of voters said that 
McCain’s choice of Palin was the most important factor in their vote.  See Local Exit Polls – 
Election Center 2008, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p6 (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Local Exit Polls]. 
 39. Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 872 (2005). 
 40. See, e.g., Alec MacGillis, For the Republican Base, Palin Pick Is Energizing, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1.  Some polling data and some Republican politicians suggested that 
Palin’s presence on the ticket hurt McCain.  See, e.g., Michael Cooper & Dalia Sussman, 
Growing Doubts on Palin Take Toll, Poll Finds, NY TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at A1; Juliet Eilperin, 
Palin Plans to Remain on GOP’s National Stage, WASH POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A14 (“The 
reservations some voters have about Palin intensified over time in the Washington Post-ABC 
News poll.  In the survey released Monday night, 44 percent of likely voters said McCain’s 
choice of Palin as his running mate had made them less apt to vote for the GOP ticket.”); Adam 
Nagourney, Second-Guessing the Vice-Presidential Pick, NY TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, available at, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/27/us/politics/27web-nagourney.html.  Meanwhile, CNN’s exit 
poll found that of the 60 percent of voters who said that McCain’s choice of Palin was a factor in 
their vote, 56 percent voted for McCain versus 43 percent for Obama.  By comparison, of the 33 
percent who said Palin was not a factor, 33 percent voted for McCain versus 65 percent for 
Obama.  Local Exit Polls, supra note 38. 
 41. Posting of Todd Tucker to Eyes on Trade, http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/ 
2008/09/coolness-to-naf.html (Sept. 17, 2008). 
 42. Press Release, Women Impacting Public Policy, National Survey Shows People Want 
US Senate to Repeal Death Tax (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http:// 
www.policyandtaxationgroup.com/pdf/NationalSurveyRepealDTax.pdf. 
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number of movable voters would pay attention to the president’s 
nominees, and we believe that the answer is yes. 
There is evidence that, for example, Americans care about the 
Supreme Court to a significant degree (and more than citizens of 
most other nations care about their highest court).43  A poll released 
in May 2008 found that 30 percent of Republicans picked Supreme 
Court appointments as their top voting issue in the upcoming 
presidential election—more than picked the war in Iraq.44  That 30 
percent of the electorate says something is their top issue does not 
mean that a given name will actually sway anything close to 30 
percent of voters.  It is unlikely that a given name will move 5 
percent or even 1 percent of the national electorate.  But if selecting a 
particular person could move even half of one percent of the voters 
in a swing state, that would be a huge impact for a presidential 
candidate.45 
The presidential election is winner-take-all.  If one of the 
candidates is behind in the polls, he should be willing to take risks to 
get ahead.  If he thinks he can potentially sway a segment of voters 
who would not otherwise vote for him, he might take the risk that he 
will offend others.  Say that Obama is having difficulty getting the 
 
 43. See James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 343 (1998). 
 44. See Scott Rasmussen, For Republicans, Judicial Appointments Matter More Than Iraq, 
RASMUSSEN REPORTS, May 21, 2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/ 
election_20082/2008_presidential_election/for_republicans_judicial_appointments_matter_more
_than_iraq. 
When it comes to how they will vote in November, Republican voters say that the type 
of Supreme Court Justices a candidate would appoint is more important than the War 
in Iraq.  The latest Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey found that 44 percent 
of Republicans pick the economy as the top voting issue, 30 percent name judicial 
appointments, and just 19 percent pick the War in Iraq. 
Id. 
 45. In this regard, it is notable that campaigns often see an electoral advantage in attacking 
either close advisers who are presumed to be likely nominees or existing appointees in election 
campaigns.  Henry Kissinger managed to be the focus of negative campaigning both by Ronald 
Reagan (in the Republican primaries and convention) and by Jimmy Carter (in the general 
election) in 1976.  See Walter Isaacson et al., Rolling Out the Big Guns, TIME, Aug. 1, 1983, 
available at http://205.188.238.109/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921297,00.html (Reagan 
criticizing Ford by saying that “Kissinger’s stewardship of U.S. foreign policy has coincided 
precisely with the loss of U.S. military supremacy.”); Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & 
Museum, Presidential Campaign Debate of October 6, 1976, http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/ 
speeches/760854.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) (“Mr. Ford, Mr. Kissinger have continued on 
with the policies and failures of Richard Nixon” and “as far as foreign policy goes, Mr. Kissinger 
has been the President of this country.”). 
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share of the women’s vote that Democratic candidates usually get 
and that he believes he needs to raise that percentage in order to win.  
One way to get that share might be to pick a female vice president.46  
But let us say that most female voters are skeptical and do not think 
that a vice president has enough power to make a difference.  Or it 
could be that Obama does not want a female vice president.  The 
female voters still need to be persuaded.  And their skepticism means 
that they will need a credible signal rather than vague promises.47  To 
solve this problem, Obama could announce that his top three picks 
for the Court are all women who share the values of Hillary Clinton 
supporters—or he could announce that Hillary herself will be his 
next pick for the Court.  If the makeup of the Court and the issues it 
addresses, such as abortion, are voting issues for a number of 
women, then such an announcement might bring a nontrivial number 
of these voters into the Obama camp. 
The point is that if candidates see that naming names is a way to 
win votes, they can be pushed to answer the question.  And a 
candidate who is behind in the polls will be more likely to offer 
names.  The risk is not that different from many of the risks 
candidates already take.  For example, a candidate who runs 
personally hostile advertisements might win over some voters but 
alienate others.  By moving the discussion of specific nominees to 
the pre-election context, we convert it into one of the weapons that 
the candidates are allowed (or forced, insofar as they are grilled by a 
questioner) to use in their competition. 
When presidential candidates give names in advance, they 
constrain themselves.  The fewer names they give per position,48 the 
greater the constraint.  That said, the president will ultimately choose 
 
 46. Some Hillary Clinton supporters said they would vote for McCain rather than Obama in 
response to the sexism that they perceived in the Democrats’ process.  See Ina Jaffe, Citing 
Sexism, Clinton Supporters Vow Switch, NPR, May 23, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=90755773.  A similar story can be told for McCain, who needed to persuade 
some conservative voters that he really was conservative.  One of the concerns had to do with 
whether he really would appoint conservative enough justices to the court.  Robert D. Novak, Is 
McCain a Conservative? WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2008, at A21 (reporting on accounts that McCain 
might have thought Alito too conservative and how these reports have concerned many 
conservatives). 
 47. See Eric Posner & Adrienne Vermuele, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865 
(2007) (discussing credible signals from the executive). 
 48. We imagine they will proffer a single name per cabinet position, to give themselves the 
maximum benefit from naming particular people. 
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just one person per position, so this is simply moving the constraint 
forward in time.  But beyond the differences discussed above about 
who will be chosen, naming names in advance does rule out one pre-
election possibility: promising, or at least suggesting, the same job to 
more than one person.  Pre-election, a presidential candidate can hint 
to multiple people that they will be his choice for secretary of the 
treasury.49  Post-election, there can be only one choice.  The 
presidential candidate will thus forego the option of (falsely) 
promising the same job to several people.  But if the choice is 
between foregoing such a constraint and not being president versus 
accepting this constraint but being president, we would expect 
candidates to choose the latter option. 
How do we game this out?  If the slates that each presidential 
candidate picked cancelled each other out (in terms of the votes 
netted by each slate), naming names would be a version of the 
prisoner’s dilemma.50  Both presidential candidates would be better 
off if neither named names in advance.  That would keep their 
choosing power at its maximum.  But the benefit of one defecting 
could be great to that one candidate (winning over swing voters).  If 
both candidates disclosed, then they would (by hypothesis) be back 
to the status quo ante, so neither candidate would have benefited 
himself, and both would have reduced their power. 
But the assumption of equal effect on voters seems unlikely: in 
all probability, the sets of names offered by the candidates will not 
have the same effect, and thus one candidate will gain support while 
the other will lose it.  This could flow in part from the public 
perceiving the second discloser as simply copying the first discloser 
and trying to play catch-up.  Even assuming no first-mover 
advantage, it seems likely that one set of names would add more 
votes to candidate A than the other set of names would add to 
candidate B, because one set of names proves more persuasive to 
more key voters. 
Thus, this would not be a prisoner’s dilemma but instead another 
potential field of competition.  What each candidate would gain is a 
better shot at the White House in a zero-sum game with his 
 
 49. Some will not even need the hint in order to imagine themselves as possible nominees. 
 50. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Prisoner’s Dilemma, http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/prisoner-dilemma/ (last updated Oct. 21, 2007). 
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opponent.  Offering the names of top appointees would become a 
new field of battle.  Candidates would be competing to pick slates 
that would persuade voters in relevant voting groups. 
Presidential candidates already compete with respect to their 
choice of running mates.  They choose vice presidents who will help 
bring particular segments of voters to their side, or at least soften the 
perception that a candidate is too extreme (e.g., Reagan choosing 
Bush), too moderate (e.g., Dole choosing Kemp), too old (e.g., Kemp 
again and McCain choosing Palin), too callow (e.g., Kennedy 
choosing Johnson), etc.51  Presidential candidates have a number of 
voting groups they want to bring into their coalition, and they know 
that no vice-presidential choice will resonate with all these groups.  
Announcing Supreme Court and cabinet choices in advance provides 
more opportunities for such balancing. 
Beyond these narrow electoral considerations, there is a larger 
public-policy benefit to announcing nominees in advance: it allows 
the president-elect’s key cabinet nominees to begin the transition 
process immediately after the November election.  As matters stand, 
a president-elect names his key officers during the transition after the 
election, and the FBI then conducts its background checks (as it does 
on all nominees).52  The result is a slow start for each new 
administration, as the president waits for his key people to be 
approved by the FBI and the Senate before they can dive into their 
work.  Two members of the 9/11 Commission argue that this current 
approach is “ineffective and dangerous” with respect to national 
security matters, where a smooth transition is crucial.53  They 
contend that the FBI should conduct background checks on top 
nominees before the election.54  That way, immediately after the 
presidential election the nominees can meet with those they will 
succeed and get up to speed on the many issues they will confront.55  
This strikes us as right: a slow start-up for a new administration can 
 
 51. See Albert, supra note 39, at 874–77 (arguing that a presidential nominee chooses a vice 
president who will neutralize perceived weaknesses or shortcomings). 
 52. The White House, Nominations & Appointments, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
appointments/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
 53. See Jamie Gorelick & Slade Gorton, Op-Ed., Between Presidents, a Dangerous Gap, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at A19. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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be costly and dangerous; naming nominees before the election will 
help the new administration get a running start. 
But, a skeptic might ask, if naming names had the potential of 
turning things around for candidates who are significantly behind in 
the polls (not to mention smoothing the presidential transition), why 
hasn’t a presidential candidate already tried this strategy?  The point 
is a fair one.  Candidates are advised by expert strategists who 
presumably have thought through every strategy and weighed costs 
and benefits.  If the strategy has not been used, it is probably because 
it is not a good one. 
We have two answers to this objection.  First, there have been 
relatively near misses and an analogue.  In the 2008 election cycle, 
Bill Richardson stated, “I would announce my cabinet before the 
election.  If I’m the nominee, I would tell you who my team would 
be.”56  Richardson did not become the nominee, but he believed that 
it would be in his interest to reveal his team.  And as we noted above, 
it has been an open secret in some campaigns that a presidential 
candidate would nominate a specific person for a specific job.57  
Beyond that, there is at least one instance from the past when a 
candidate did something akin to our proposal.  In 1976, when Ronald 
Reagan was fighting Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination and 
needed to persuade the Republican moderates, he took the risky step 
of violating convention by naming his vice-presidential running mate 
prior to securing the nomination.58  He hoped that naming his vice-
presidential candidate (Richard Schweiker) would turn a number of 
the delegates in his direction.59  Reagan eventually lost, but the 
Schweiker strategy reportedly moved him closer than he would have 
been otherwise.60 
 
 56. Philip Elliott, Richardson Promises Cabinet Preview, WASH. POST, July 28, 2007, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/28/AR2007072 
800781.html. 
 57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (on Thomas Dewey indicating that he would 
nominate John Dulles); McIntyre supra note 10 and accompanying text (George W. Bush 
indicating that he would nominate Colin Powell). 
 58. Matt Negrin, Risky Strategy That Doomed Reagan in ‘76 Could Boost Democrats, B. 
GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2008, at A12. 
 59. See id. 
 60. A 2008 Boston Globe article reminded readers of the Schweiker strategy, speculating 
that Hillary Clinton might want to name a vice-presidential candidate early so as to try to sway 
some of the superdelegates who were on the fence.  Id.  More recently, a candidate for governor 
in Maryland in 2006 picked his running mate nine months before the Democratic primary and 
won both the primary and the general election.  Id.  Note though that the Schweiker strategy does 
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The above examples are few and far between.  Our second 
answer is that the benefits for the candidates themselves from such a 
strategy, even when they are far behind, probably do not outweigh 
the costs.  The costs include not being able to promise patronage 
appointments after the election.  Additionally, the fact that these 
appointments were preapproved by the electorate (and may be 
instrumental in seeing the president in question elected) would give 
the appointees a level of independence that many presidential 
candidates would not want to cede.  On their own, the candidates 
probably have other risks that they are more willing to take when 
they are behind in the polls.  But the benefits are sufficiently close to 
the costs for candidates that we believe the norm can be changed.  
This is why our proposal has a chance of working only if there is 
some method of pushing the candidates to compete over names—
perhaps by forcing them to tackle the question in a competitive 
public debate setting where they are under pressure to score points 
over their opponents. 
IV.  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRE- AND POST- 
ELECTION NOMINEES 
If candidates did give names, how might pre-election nominees 
differ from post-election nominees?  Are they likely to be more 
ideologically extreme?  More likely to come from a swing state?  
More likely to represent a voting bloc?  We begin with the area of 
greatest uncertainty (perceived position on the political spectrum) 
and then move to areas about which we think we can have some 
degree of confidence. 
A.  Ideology 
The effect of pre- versus post-election announcement on 
ideology is least certain.  Will a presidential candidate choose 
nominees who tend to be political moderates (perhaps even members 
of the opposite party)?  Might a candidate instead lean toward 
candidates associated with the most ideological wing of their party?  
 
appear to have angered some conservatives.  See NBC Evening News: Campaign 1976, 
Republican Convention: Buckley (NBC television broadcast Aug. 11, 1976), available at 
http://openweb.tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/1976-8/1976-08-11-NBC-2.html (noting that Reagan 
delegate and conservative North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms did not like Schweiker as the vice-
presidential choice). 
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Relatedly, might a candidate choose a nominee associated with a 
powerful interest group, even if that group is unpopular with a 
substantial segment of voters?  Because there are arguments on both 
sides, depending on how a presidential campaign plays out, these 
issues are difficult to predict. 
The conventional wisdom of presidential campaigns is that 
candidates play to the base in the primaries and then move toward 
the middle in the general election.61  The candidates want to capture 
swing voters in the middle, so they emphasize how moderate they 
are.  If this dynamic prevails for a given presidential candidate, then 
we might expect him to name moderate Supreme Court and cabinet 
nominees.  He might even want to name one or more moderate 
members of the opposite party.  Naming a vice president from the 
opposing party entails significant risks (since that person would 
succeed the president if he died in office) and has been done only 
once in United States history, with what is widely regarded as a bad 
result (the presidency of Andrew Johnson).62  But there might be 
nontrivial benefits to Obama and/or Romney announcing that he will 
nominate one or more members of the opposite party as key cabinet 
members or as Supreme Court justices. 
That said, sometimes presidential campaigns prioritize 
energizing their bases.  George W. Bush’s 2004 strategy, which 
focused on bringing out core supporters, is a prime example.63  If 
energizing supporters is a high priority, then we might expect more 
ideological nominees. 
Then there is the related possibility of appeasing an organized 
voter group.  Depending on the central issues for such a group, 
appealing to its members could push a candidate toward the middle 
of the voting populace or toward extremes.  If, say, the Concord 
Coalition were able to motivate a large number of voters under a 
banner of fiscal responsibility, appeasing its members might appeal 
to a wide range of moderate voters.  That said, the aims of most 
organized voter groups tend to be more ideologically skewed.  These 
 
 61. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, Red Meat Season, WASH. POST, June 10, 2007, at B01. 
 62. See, e.g., Henry Olsen, Lieberman Would Be a Bad Veep Choice for McCain, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 27, 2008, at A15. 
 63. See, e.g., Craig Gilbert, 2008 Presidential Candidates Obama, McCain find lessons in 
2004 Campaign, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., June 29, 2008, http://www.jsonline.com/news/president/ 
29561629.html. 
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groups are generally organized to push a particular agenda that they 
believe the political mainstream does not adequately represent.  The 
ideology is part and parcel of their existence and appeal.  In keeping 
with their origins, their ideology tends to be outside the political 
mainstream.  Among the more significant of these groups, in terms 
of a history of mobilizing issue-based voters, are the National Rifle 
Association, trade unions, and conservative religious groups like 
Focus on the Family Action.  Insofar as the candidates favored by 
these groups tend to play to each party’s base (as we think is the 
case), naming such a candidate as a cabinet or Supreme Court choice 
would push the presidential candidate out of the mainstream, at least 
on the issue(s) that the mobilization group cared about.  The 
presidential candidate’s calculation, presumably, would be that many 
more members of the group would change their votes if their favored 
candidate were nominated for a post than would non-members of the 
group abandon the presidential candidate in disappointment.  For 
example, it may be that John McCain would have gained more votes 
among conservative Christians by naming one or more of their 
choices as a Supreme Court nominee than he would have lost among 
the rest of the voting populace, if it turned out that many more 
conservative Christians vote based on the Supreme Court than other 
voters do.64 
The problem with predictions about the ideological valence of a 
presidential candidate’s choices is that there are many different ways 
a campaign can play out.  In some campaigns, a candidate may 
believe he needs to shore up support among elements of his core 
supporters or voter-mobilization groups outside the political center.  
In others, he may believe that he needs to appeal to moderates.  Does 
that mean that we cannot say anything about a presidential 
candidate’s likely choices?  On the contrary, we can say with some 
confidence that naming names before an election will tend to favor 
 
 64. Announcing nominees pre-election could give leverage to politically cohesive 
minorities—including issue-based groups, as well as racial and ethnic minorities who might want 
to use their votes to have narrow concerns addressed.  Given that minority groups are typically 
not large enough to sway an election through their votes, most minority groups have to throw 
their support behind presidential candidates who are promising vague support to a variety of 
groups.  These candidates, once elected, may not deliver.  If, however, the candidates were to 
compete on naming potential nominees for posts that these minority groups cared specifically 
about, this would be a method by which minority groups could concentrate the effect of their 
votes.  Pre-election, these groups would be able to compare the names from the two presidential 
candidates to see which one would better match their views on the issues of importance to them. 
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appointees from swing states and appointees with significant 
followings, and will strongly disfavor appointees whose main claim 
to fame is that they are confidants of the presidential candidate. 
B.  Swing States 
Because of the Electoral College, presidential elections are a 
simultaneous set of state elections.  And some states loom large—the 
swing states that can collectively determine the outcome of an 
election.65  In the 2004 presidential election, the key swing states 
were Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.66  Political analysts correctly 
predicted that the candidate who won two of those three states would 
also win the election.67  The identity of the key swing states could be 
different in future elections, but the number of such key states will 
still likely be small.68 
Candidates know this.  The obvious strategy for a candidate is to 
appeal to the voters in an important state by naming appointees who 
will particularly appeal to voters from that state.  A Democrat might 
promise to make Ohio’s popular governor, Ted Strickland, his 
secretary of the treasury.  A Republican might make the same 
promise for equally popular Governor Charlie Crist of Florida.  Or 
maybe a presidential candidate would pick a person from a swing 
state with more obvious credentials for the job (say, a sitting state 
supreme court justice as a Supreme Court nominee) as a way of 
showing a commitment to quality while also choosing a favorite son 
or daughter. 
There is a cost to this strategy.  Voters in other states may feel 
slighted because their governor (or whomever they favor) was not 
selected.  But the point about swing states is that only a relatively 
small number of states are likely to be significant, in terms of the 
Electoral College.  Some voters in Utah might be upset if Romney or 
Obama announced a Missourian as the attorney general nominee.  
 
 65. See, e.g., Jim Malone, Analysts Say Swing States Hold Key to US Election, 
VOANEWS.COM, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-10-24-voa41.cfm. 
 66. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Bush, Kerry Split in 3 Key Swing States, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
28, 2004, at A1. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Political Geography, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2008, http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/campaign08/political-geography/ (identifying Montana, 
Missouri, Indiana, Ohio, North Carolina, and Florida as swing states for the 2008 presidential 
election). 
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But any defections in Utah will almost assuredly have no effect on 
Utah’s likelihood of voting Republican.  Given the benefits of 
gaining even half of one percent of the voters in a swing state by 
promising a job to a favored politician, such a strategy may make 
sense.69 
C.  Those with a Following Versus Confidants 
Similarly predictable are two other phenomena that are related 
to each other: presidential candidates tend to choose people who 
have some significant political support on their own, and they tend 
not to choose people whose sole claim to fame is their relationship 
with the candidate. 
The point of a campaign is to gain votes, and the safest way to 
do that is to select appointees who are popular with voters.  That 
should lead presidential candidates to choose appointees who are 
political figures in their own right with a substantial number of 
supporters and a much smaller number of detractors.  The goal is to 
find appointees who will have the maximum appeal, and that is likely 
to mean people with strong and positive reputations. 
It is possible that in some situations these considerations will 
lead a candidate to name appointees who are regarded for their 
ability and judgment but are not widely known among the electorate.  
Their following would be created by the positive responses of the 
commentariat to their selection.  President Ford’s decision to 
 
 69. If this happened it would be a return to an earlier model: for most of the history of the 
United States, Supreme Court and cabinet choices were understood to reflect regional and state-
based balancing.  There was a perceived southern seat on the Court, for instance (along with the 
more recent “Jewish seat” and the still more recent “woman’s seat”).  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD 
SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR 
HISTORY 128 (1986) (discussing the New York seat and the New England seat); John Copeland 
Nagle, Choosing the Judges Who Choose the President, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 499 (2002)  
(“Geographic diversity was crucial throughout the nineteenth century.  Certain positions on the 
Supreme Court were viewed as the ‘New England seat’ or the ‘Southern seat,’ to be occupied 
only by jurists hailing from that part of the nation.  Religious diversity has also been important on 
occasion, particularly since the implicit establishment of a ‘Jewish seat’ on the Court with 
President Wilson's appointment of Justice Brandeis.  More recently, racial and gender diversity 
has played a significant role in appointments throughout the federal and state judiciary.”); 
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Agency Cost Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act: Recalling the 
Virtues of Delegating Complex Decisions, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659 (1992) (noting “[t]he 
establishment of a ‘black's’ and a ‘woman's’ seat on the Supreme Court”).  And it was widely 
understood that, just as a vice president was chosen for regional balance, so too were cabinet 
members.  Further, it was often understood that particular powerful states—Ohio, New York, and 
Pennsylvania prominent among them—needed to have representation in the cabinet. 
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nominate Edward Levi, who was Dean of the Chicago Law School 
and President of the University of Chicago before being chosen as 
the Attorney General, is one example.70  Ford’s decision was praised 
by politicians and commentators who saw Levi as a break from the 
perceived cronyism and corruption of the Nixon administration.71  
Even though Levi was not a major political figure on his own, he 
became a political asset because of the reaction to him.  A 
presidential candidate might similarly want to dispel any appearance 
of cronyism by choosing an appointee who had a sterling 
reputation—especially for the Supreme Court, where the public 
expects probity and wisdom. 
This relates to the proposition about which we have the most 
confidence: a candidate usually will not choose appointees who have 
neither an existing following nor a sterling reputation, but instead are 
largely known as friends or confidants of the candidate.  Such a 
person brings little value to the electoral equation and brings costs 
insofar as she seems to have gained her job through cronyism.  
Candidate George W. Bush might have said that he would select 
a prominent judge with whom he was friendly for the Supreme Court 
(e.g., a member of the Texas Supreme Court), but there is little 
chance that, pre-election, he would have named Harriet Miers as a 
possible Supreme Court selection.  Her stature was perceived to be 
purely a function of her relationship with him.  In the pre-election 
context of a competition for votes, she would have added little.  And 
the taint of cronyism would have cost him votes.72  The same is true 
of Robert Kennedy’s appointment.  Just as it is hard to imagine 
candidate Bush naming Harriet Miers, it is hard to imagine candidate 
John Kennedy naming his brother as his selection for attorney 
general.  
D.  Diversity and Minority Interests 
If a candidate decides to announce nominees, he might 
sometimes strategically choose more than one name.  Return to the 
example of Obama seeking to persuade skeptical women voters and 
 
 70. See Chris Lehmann, Bedtime for Gonzo: ‘Where’s Ed Levi Now That We Need Him?’, 
N.Y. OBSERVER, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://www.observer.com/2007/bedtime-gonzo. 
 71. See CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 141-42 (1992). 
 72. E.g., David Greenberg, Supreme Court Cronyism: Bush Restarts a Long and Troubled 
Tradition, SLATE, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2127493/. 
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assuming that their concern rests largely with whether he will 
nominate a pro-choice woman to the Court.  It might help assuage 
the women voters’ concerns more if Obama asserted that not only 
was his most favored nominee for the Court a pro-choice woman, but 
so were three of his next four favorites.  This would provide 
additional assurance to skeptical voters that even if the top choice did 
not work out, there was still a high likelihood that a woman would be 
nominated.  The broader point is that naming names could well have 
an impact on various forms of diversity, in particular for Court 
nominees.  If a candidate names three or more potential Supreme 
Court nominees, almost assuredly not all three will be white males 
(although all three could conceivably be women).  A candidate who 
names only one nominee, however, might well choose a white male. 
V.  OBJECTIONS 
A.  Legality 
18 U.S.C. § 599 provides, in relevant part: 
Whoever, being a candidate, directly or indirectly promises 
or pledges the appointment, or the use of his influence or 
support for the appointment of any person to any public or 
private position or employment, for the purpose of 
procuring support in his candidacy shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.73 
Does this statute prevent a candidate from announcing during the 
campaign whom he would nominate for cabinet or Supreme Court 
positions?74  No.  Depending on methodology, this statute can be 
interpreted in different ways.  There is a textual ambiguity in the 
statute: the trigger for the statute is “procuring support in his 
candidacy.”75  Is this trigger procuring support from the public for his 
candidacy or instead procuring support from the potential nominee 
 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 599 (2000). 
 74. Some blogs have answered this question in the affirmative, albeit without any legal 
analysis beyond citing the existence of the statute.  See Posting of Kevin Drum to 
WashingtonMonthly.com, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_01/ 
010654.php (Jan. 31, 2007, 11:38 EST) (raising the possibility that pre-election announcements 
of names might violate federal anti-patronage laws); see also Posting of Michael to Discourse.net, 
http://www.discourse.net/archives/2004/03/why_kerry_will_not_appoint_a_shadow_cabinet.html 
(Mar. 6, 2004, 10:29 EST). 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 599. 
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(or perhaps the potential nominee’s associates) for his candidacy?  
As a matter of sentence construction, the answer is not clear.  The 
best argument in favor of § 599’s application to the announcement of 
proposed cabinet and Supreme Court members is 18 U.S.C. § 600, 
which specifically covers quid pro quo bribery.76  Note, though, that 
§ 600 applies to promises regarding “employment, position, 
compensation, contract, appointment, or other benefit, provided for 
or made possible in whole or in part by any Act of Congress.”  
Hence it may be that both § 599 and § 600 were focused on quid pro 
quo corruption, but § 600 is more focused on those involving acts of 
Congress.  Beyond these textual considerations, the legislative 
history of 18 U.S.C. § 599 reveals that Congress targeted corruption 
in the form of candidates secretly auctioning government 
appointments in return for money and political patronage from 
corrupt interests.77  The fear was that a candidate would go “to the 
corrupt interests and tell them that he will be their agent and tool.”78  
Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress had the 
remotest concerns about the sort of statements we are proposing, 
 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 600 provides: 
Whoever, directly or indirectly, promises any employment, position, compensation, 
contract, appointment, or other benefit, provided for or made possible in whole or in 
part by any Act of Congress, or any special consideration in obtaining any such benefit, 
to any person as consideration, favor, or reward for any political activity or for the 
support of or opposition to any candidate or any political party in connection with any 
general or special election to any political office, or in connection with any primary 
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political 
office, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
 77. 66 CONG. REC. 2603 (1925). 
 78. Id. (statement of Sen. Heflin).  The statute was originally passed as the Federal Corrupt 
Practice Act of 1925.  In addition to the statement by Senator Heflin, its sponsor, Senator David 
Walsh, explained the purpose of the bill: since money had become increasingly influential in 
campaigns, candidates must “put themselves under the domination and influence and control and 
direction of those who have wealth” if they want to win.  Id. (statement of Sen. Walsh).  The 
1925 statute applied only to Senate and House candidates.  Federal Corrupt Practice Act of 1925, 
43 Stat. 1073; CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM; A SOURCEBOOK 29 (Anthony Corrado ed., 1997).  
The statute was codified and moved to Title 18 in 1948, but “the original intent of Congress is 
preserved.”  94 CONG. REC. 8721 (1948) (quoting Sen. Wiley).  After passing the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971, Congress included presidential and vice-presidential candidates 
under the relevant sections of Title 18.  But it did so with its eye on the corrupting power of 
money, the original intent of the statute.  See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearing 
on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956 Before the S. Comm. on Communications of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 92d Cong. 368 (1971) (statement of Joseph Califano) (“Isn’t the relationship between 
campaign contributions and ambassadorial posts a luxury beyond our national means in the crisis-
prone world of the 1970’s?  Are not domestic issues sufficiently complex to require high level 
executive branch appointments on the basis of ability without regard to financial contributions?”). 
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which would be neither based on money nor secret.  It is hard to see 
how such announcements could be regarded as the sort of corruption 
at which Congress was aiming. 
We do not dwell on these arguments regarding statutory 
interpretation because any attempt at applying this statute to a 
candidate’s promises would violate the First Amendment.  In Brown 
v. Hartlage,79 the United States Supreme Court confronted a state 
statute very similar to § 599.80  A candidate for county commissioner 
had promised to lower commissioners’ salaries if elected, and the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals found that this violated the following 
state statute: 
[W]hen a candidate offers to discharge the duties of an 
elective office for less than the salary fixed by law, a salary 
which must be paid by taxation, he offers to reduce pro 
tanto the amount of taxes each individual taxpayer must 
pay, and thus makes an offer to the voter of pecuniary 
gain.81 
The Supreme Court reversed, unanimously.  The Court treated this 
regulation of candidates’ speech as subject to strict scrutiny (one in a 
long line of cases so finding),82 and it invalidated this statute because 
it failed the first prong of a strict scrutiny inquiry: the identification 
 
 79. 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
 80. The statute at issue in Hartlage provided that: 
No candidate for nomination or election to any state, county, city or district office shall 
expend, pay, promise, loan or become pecuniarily liable in any way for money or other 
thing of value, either directly or indirectly, to any person in consideration of the vote or 
financial or moral support of that person.  No such candidate shall promise, agree or 
make a contract with any person to vote for or support any particular individual, thing 
or measure, in consideration for the vote or the financial or moral support of that 
person in any election, primary or nominating convention, and no person shall require 
that any candidate make such a promise, agreement or contract. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.055 (West 1982). 
 81. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 51 n.6 (quoting Sparks v. Boggs, 339 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1960) (internal citation omitted)). 
 82. See Buckley v. Valeo, 452 U.S. 946 (1976); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
218–19 (1966). 
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect 
the free discussion of governmental affairs.  This of course includes discussions of 
candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is 
operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes. 
Id. 
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of a compelling state interest.  The Court noted that there was a 
plausible claim that a promise to accept a lower salary would reduce 
voters’ taxes, but it found that the state’s interest in preventing vote-
buying was not implicated because “Brown did not offer some 
private payment or donation in exchange for voter support; Brown’s 
statement can only be construed as an expression of his intention to 
exercise public power in a manner that he believed might be 
acceptable to some class of citizens.”83  As the Court emphatically 
stated: 
Candidate commitments enhance the accountability of 
government officials to the people whom they represent, 
and assist the voters in predicting the effect of their vote.  
The fact that some voters may find their self-interest 
reflected in a candidate’s commitment does not place that 
commitment beyond the reach of the First Amendment.  We 
have never insisted that the franchise be exercised without 
taint of individual benefit; indeed, our tradition of political 
pluralism is partly predicated on the expectation that voters 
will pursue their individual good through the political 
process, and that the summation of these individual pursuits 
will further the collective welfare.  So long as the hoped-for 
personal benefit is to be achieved through the normal 
processes of government, and not through some private 
arrangement, it has always been, and remains, a reputable 
basis upon which to cast one’s ballot.84 
In Hartlage, there was at least a plausible interest that the state 
could articulate (avoiding vote-buying), even though it was 
unpersuasive.85  It is difficult to see any legitimate—much less 
compelling—interest that the government would have in preventing 
 
 83. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 58. 
 84. Id. at 55–56; see also id. at 60 
In barring certain public statements with respect to this issue, the State ban runs 
directly contrary to the fundamental premises underlying the First Amendment as the 
guardian of our democracy.  That Amendment embodies our trust in the free exchange 
of ideas as the means by which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad, 
and between candidates for political office.  The State’s fear that voters might make an 
ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting 
speech. 
Id. 
 85. Id. at 54. 
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corruption via prohibiting the naming of cabinet or Supreme Court 
nominees.  Put differently, it is hard to fathom what the state’s 
interest would be.  In Hartlage, there was a benefit to voters in the 
form of reduced taxes,86 but here there is no benefit to voters other 
than the likely nomination of appointees whom they would like to 
see in positions of power—and there is no conceivable state interest 
in preventing that from happening. 
The government might have an interest in prohibiting concealed 
promises from candidates to potential nominees.  Secret promises 
give no information to voters, so their only benefit is a private one to 
the candidate and/or to the nominee.  That underscores the 
implausibility of any government interest in preventing the public 
naming of nominees in advance.  There is no corrupting element. 
A different way to come at this question is to consider why the 
First Amendment is treated as placing a high value on electioneering 
speech.  One reason is because an active and full debate among 
candidates helps voters make more informed choices.87  The voters 
are the customers choosing among products in the marketplace of 
ideas.  Reading the statute to prohibit the public disclosure of 
prospective nominees results in the implicit (and sometimes explicit) 
bargains between presidential candidates and prospective nominees 
being pushed underground.  And that in turn prevents voters from 
being able to evaluate the competing bargains that the different 
candidates have struck—the opposite of what First Amendment 
values push toward.  In effect, this occurred with Earl Warren’s 
appointment to the Supreme Court in 1953.  Dwight Eisenhower 
reportedly promised Earl Warren that he would be appointed to the 
Court as soon as a seat opened up.88  The public, though, had no way 
of factoring this promise into their decision as to whether to vote for 
Eisenhower. 
It is simply impossible to imagine any compelling interest for 
the application of § 599 to our proposal, much less a compelling 
interest to which application of § 599 would be narrowly tailored.  
And it bears noting that in the years since Hartlage, the Court has, if 
anything, raised the First Amendment bar for regulations on 
 
 86. Id. at 48. 
 87. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1048 (2d ed. 2005). 
 88. See Dorsen, supra note 18, at 657. 
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campaign speech.  For example, the Court has held that a prohibition 
on candidates for judicial office “‘announc[ing] his or her views on 
disputed legal or political issues’” violates the First Amendment, 
despite the obvious state interest in avoiding the appearance of 
impartiality.89  The bottom line, then, is that application of § 599 to 
our proposal would run afoul of the First Amendment, and the matter 
seems so clear that the weight of expert opinion would so conclude. 
The clarity of this unconstitutionality is important.  We could 
imagine a candidate’s staff concluding that a seeming prohibition on 
some planned activity would not apply, but also that reasonable 
minds could differ as to legality, so that the candidate should not 
engage in that activity.  Section 599 is not one of those cases, 
because there is no plausible argument that its application to a 
presidential candidate is consistent with First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Just as the vast majority of economists said that a 
summer “gas tax holiday” would be a bad idea,90 so too the vast 
majority of legal scholars would conclude that application of § 599 
to the naming of cabinet or Supreme Court members would be 
unconstitutional.  It bears noting that the revelation of the 
economists’ views on the gas tax holiday coincided with a shift in 
polls on the issue; early support by a majority of those polled gave 
way to majority opposition once the economists’ views became 
known.91 
Perhaps that clarity explains why § 599 has never been the 
subject of a single case and why it has come up so rarely: those who 
might raise the issue know that they are subject to the objections that 
not only are they being legalistic and litigious but also their legal 
arguments fail on their own terms because the statute is so obviously 
unconstitutional.  In the public’s eye, one of the few things worse 
than a narrow, legalistic claim is a narrow, legalistic claim that, 
according to experts, is flatly wrong because it is unconstitutional. 
 
 89. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002) (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)). 
 90. See, e.g., Bryan Caplan, The 18-Cent Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2008, at A37. 
 91. See, e.g., Posting of Brad Aaron, Q Poll Finds Americans Opposed to Gas Tax 
“Holiday”, to Streetsblog (May 15, 2008), http://www.streetsblog.org/2008/05/15/q-poll-finds-
americans-opposed-to-gas-tax-holiday; Matthew Yglesias, Shocking Results, THEATLANTIC.COM, 
May 5, 2008, http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/05/shocking_results.php. 
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B.  Too Much Like an Election 
In effect, we are pushing toward more direct democracy.  The 
large literature on the evils of judicial elections suggests that moving 
toward something akin to the election of justices on the Court is 
crazy.92  But if unpacked, the objection to the election of judges is 
not that elections are bad.  Instead, the objection is primarily to 
uninformed voters.93  The argument is that the electorate has little 
incentive to obtain the information necessary to make good choices, 
so the result is more farce than anything resembling an election.  The 
typical critique of elections involves invoking some story of an 
election in which some unqualified candidate won simply because he 
had a catchy name or that his name resembled that of someone 
famous.94 
But even conceding that voters are not adequately informed 
when it comes to local and state elections, they will likely have more 
information regarding a Supreme Court justice or a top cabinet 
position.  If anything, because the candidates are competing for 
voters, the supporters of the different potential nominees will 
compete to provide more information about their favorite nominees, 
in the hope that the candidates will choose them.  Lack of 
information about the nominees is unlikely to be the problem.95 
 
 92. E.g., Bronson D. Bills, A Penny for the Court’s Thoughts? The High Price of Judicial 
Elections, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 29 (2008). 
 93. E.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Law Is the Mere Continuation of Politics by Different Means: 
American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Century, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 423 (2007). 
 94. Id. 
 95. A different concern is that voters will be interested only in one issue, such as abortion 
and (for a Supreme Court justice) thus whether Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), will be 
overturned.  Given the voting public’s focus on a limited set of oversimplified issues, one might 
fear that the naming of a potential nominee to the Court would simply result in voters asking 
whether this nominee would vote in favor of upholding Roe or not.  We do not see why it would 
be a terrible thing if voters had better information as to whether a presidential candidate would 
appoint justices who would overturn or affirm Roe.  As a general principle, we should prefer 
voting that is better informed.  The fear, though, is that better informed voting about a single issue 
will do more harm than good.  But persuadable voters will care about a range of issues that they 
believe the Supreme Court may decide—Roe, Ten Commandments displays, the Second 
Amendment, etc.—not just one single issue.  The hot-button issues that interest voters do not, of 
course, encompass the range of cases that the Supreme Court decides.  But that is already the 
case: with respect to Supreme Court nominees, not only the public but also interest groups and 
Senators focus on a few hot-button issues.  And the advantage of our proposal is that voters get 
much more information about presidential candidates and their administration’s policies before 
they cast their votes. 
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A related objection is that cabinet members or Court appointees 
whose names were announced pre-election might see themselves as 
having received a mandate from the voters, independent of the 
president.  They may, in other words, have their own agendas.  An 
example here is another recent historical analogue—George W. 
Bush’s broad hints that he would name Colin Powell as his secretary 
of state.96  This pre-election anointing might have led Powell to see 
himself as having an independent connection to the voters and thus 
led him to resist the Bush administration’s agenda.  One 
commentator put this forward as a reason why pre-election 
announcements are unwise, suggesting that such announcements will 
lead to greater independence on the part of cabinet members.97  Of 
course, whether this is desirable or not is hotly contested.  This 
implicates one of the central questions regarding the structure of the 
federal government: how much control should a president have over 
those who serve in his administration?  There are no easy answers to 
this question, as an increase in presidential control will strike some 
as beneficial and others as harmful.  But, in any event, the president 
would still have the same legal authority—including the ability to 
fire those in his cabinet. 
The Supreme Court bears particular emphasis on this question of 
independence.  Most people would embrace independence in a 
Supreme Court justice with good reason: if justices simply mirror the 
views of the president who appoints them, then they are acting as a 
small, unrepresentative group of life-tenured super-legislators—and 
it is far from clear why we should embrace that state of affairs.98 
The larger point is that the competition for votes is what matters.  
If presidential candidates think that voters prefer to elect a president 
with advisers and Court appointees who are beholden to him, then let 
us force them to take that position.  And maybe we will have a 
 
 96. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 10. 
 97. See Posting of Jacob T. Levy to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/ 
archive_2004_07_14.shtml#1089997773 (Jul. 16, 2004, 13:09 EST). 
 98. Books can be—and have been—written on this subject, and we will not dwell on it here.  
But the overwhelming weight of the commentary is that it would be undesirable to have a Court 
whose members simply voted as the president who appointed them would.  Empirical research 
suggests that the alignment of Supreme Court justices and the views of the presidents appointing 
them have been increasing over time.  See Lee Epstein et al., The Increasing Importance of 
Ideology in the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L .REV. 609 
(2008). 
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competition where the presidential candidates adopt different 
strategies.  One would disclose his prospective cabinet and Court 
nominees, and the other would not.  The voters would be better 
informed as to what type of president they were voting for.99 
C.  Too Much Pressure and Scrutiny on the Nominees 
A third objection involves the scrutiny of the nominees.  
Arguably, there is a greater incentive for political opponents to find 
damaging information about a nominee before the election, for the 
simple reason that such information could help to change the 
outcome of the election.  Torpedoing an elected president’s nominee 
has some benefits for the opposition (tarnishing the president, 
perhaps getting a replacement nominee more to the opposition’s 
liking), but the president still gets to choose the failed nominee’s 
replacement.  Damaging a nominee pre-election, however, might 
have a greater payoff, because it might sufficiently hurt the candidate 
(likely distracting the candidate from his message, and perhaps 
making him seem like a poor judge of character) to cause him to lose 
the election.  After all, we are positing that the naming of a nominee 
could swing the election in a candidate’s favor.  If that is so, then 
maybe the tarnishing of the nominee could swing the election back 
toward the candidate’s opponent.  And in light of the incentives to 
find dirt on the pre-election nominees, wouldn’t the scrutiny be too 
severe?  Maybe it would be so severe that it would dissuade the best 
nominees.  And surely, it would be uncomfortable for a sitting 
judge—on a state or lower federal court—to be the topic of debate 
during a presidential election. 
 
 99. What about the danger that having to name names in advance might unduly constrain the 
president’s ability to adjust to changed circumstances?  After all, in the period between the 
presidential election and when a seat on the Supreme Court opens up, circumstances can change.  
Those changed circumstances can, in turn, alter presidential preferences regarding appointments 
to the Court.  The point is a fair one.  Having named names in advance, the president would not 
be able to alter names as easily as he would have been able to do otherwise.  But that is not 
necessarily a bad thing.  If changed circumstances required a deviation from the previously 
named names, the president would have to explain, with specific reasons, why the new name was 
better in the context of those changed circumstances.  For example, say that it is three years since 
the presidential election before a seat opens up on the Court.  In that period, a new star has 
emerged in the ranks of the state court judiciary—one who is considered fair minded and 
insightful and whose opinions are the most cited of any state court judge in the country.  For the 
president to name this person over the previously named individual, he would have to provide a 
credible and detailed explanation for why the new nominee was better than the prior one.  Vague 
statements about how “this is the most qualified individual” would not suffice.  The end result 
would be greater transparency. 
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The potential benefits of attacking an opponent’s nominees are 
greater pre-election than post-election.  But so are the potential costs.  
If, say, Romney announced nominees who were subjected to attacks 
that the public perceived as unfair, the public would likely attribute 
the unfairness to Obama.  Obama probably would not persuade many 
people if he tried to say that the attacks were independent of him; 
people would likely believe that his people were involved in it, just 
as voters believed that George H.W. Bush was involved in the Willie 
Horton advertisement in 1988.100  Indeed, if Obama tried to distance 
himself from attacks on Romney’s nominees, voters might see that as 
him trying to weasel out of responsibility.  In other words, in the 
crucible of an election, when the battle between two opposing 
ideologies is personified in a race between two individuals, the 
benefits and costs of everything relating to the campaign are received 
and borne by those two individuals. 
It still may be that campaigns decide that a particular attack will 
win over more persuadable voters than it will deter.  Increasing your 
vote count and/or decreasing your opponent’s are the only cost and 
benefit that matter to a campaign.  One can imagine many different 
attacks, and some percentage of them will win more votes than they 
will lose.  But it is difficult even for political professionals to figure 
out in advance which attacks will work and which will not, and 
sometimes they explode in the face of those peddling the 
information.  In 2004, presidential candidate John Kerry pointedly 
noted that Dick Cheney’s daughter is a lesbian,101 hoping to score 
political points.  But the reaction to his statement was so negative 
that it likely was counterproductive for Kerry.102 
Indeed, the scrutiny for those named before the election could be 
lower—and perhaps better, from the candidate’s and the populace’s 
perspective—than it would be after the election.  There are a couple 
of reasons why this might be the case.  First, during an election, 
given that there are numerous other issues to be debated, the scrutiny 
may be lower.  Further, the larger the number of names announced, 
 
 100. See, e.g., Jake Tapper, The Willie Horton Alumni Assocation, SALON, Aug. 25, 2000, 
http://archive.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/08/25/horton/index.html. 
 101. Tom Vanden Brook, Kerry Lesbian Remark Angers Cheneys, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 
2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-10-14-lynne-
cheney_x.htm. 
 102. Sharon Kehnemui Liss, Kerry Clarifies ‘Lesbian’ Remark, FOX NEWS, Oct. 16, 2004, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,135392,00.html. 
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the lower the attention paid to any one of those names is likely to be.  
Second, think about the type of scrutiny that might be applied before 
an election versus after.  After the election, the president has control 
of the choice.  Scrutiny therefore tends to be largely of the 
muckraking variety—looking to see whether the nominee rented 
dirty videos or joined some inappropriate student group while in 
college.  That makes sense, since the only game being played is 
unearthing enough dirt to tank the nominee.  If the game is moved to 
the pre-election period, however, the scrutiny might be in terms of 
which presidential candidate has the better proposed nominees.  In 
other words, it might be scrutiny of the useful and positive variety.  
Some of the proposed nominees might still come out looking worse 
for the wear.  But those potential nominees, if given the choice, may 
prefer scrutiny before the election over scrutiny after.103 
A particular incentive for potential nominees is that there may 
be a kind of estoppel effect.  A potential nominee whose name was 
put forward before the election and whose candidate won could make 
two related arguments.  First, my candidate won the election after 
releasing my name, so the voters effectively ratified my selection.  
Second, you had a chance to make your objections before the 
election, and you failed to do so persuasively, so now it is unfair for 
you to bring forward new arguments or even to oppose me. 
One might still imagine that potential nominees will not want to 
be named in advance, because they will know that the scrutiny may 
be for naught.  After all, the most obvious difference between pre- 
and post-election nomination is that the scrutiny after the election is 
only for the nominee whose candidate is elected, whereas the 
scrutiny before the election is for two sets of nominees (one for each 
major party presidential candidate, assuming that both decide to 
name their nominees).  So one set of names will be subject to public 
scrutiny and then still not be selected for the positions, because their 
candidate lost the election.  In addition, if a presidential candidate 
names three possible choices for each given cabinet position, then 
 
 103. Relatedly, since expected scrutiny and expected penalty go hand in hand in making 
strategic choices during an election, it may be that the penalty for naming a person who turns out 
to have a sordid past might not be as large in the pre-election context.  Perhaps, in the pre-election 
context, because the public will know that the candidate had less time to evaluate the potential 
nominees, the penalty will be lower.  We concede, however, that it may be that the first time or 
two a presidential candidate names names, the public will expect lots of vetting (because of the 
boldness of trying something new). 
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not only would the losing candidate’s choices be subject to scrutiny 
without obtaining the cabinet position, but so would two-thirds of the 
winning candidate’s named choices.  This last point is a reason why 
a presidential candidate might choose to name a single person for 
each cabinet position.  The biggest payoff for undecided and 
skeptical voters arises if they know that their favored candidate will 
be secretary of X, rather than knowing that their favored candidate is 
one of three possibilities. 
But let us return to the nominees of the presidential candidate 
who loses.  What difference will this make?  It will disappoint those 
who are named by presidential candidates who lose the election.  But 
will it make enough of a difference to persuade anyone to remove her 
name from consideration by a presidential candidate?  We doubt that 
it would, for a few reasons.  First, there is distinction in being chosen 
by a candidate.  Everyone would prefer to be secretary of the 
treasury rather than simply to be proffered as the secretary if one’s 
presidential candidate wins.  The question is which of the following 
would be a person’s second choice: (1) to be named as a presidential 
candidate’s choice for secretary of X but have one’s candidate lose; 
(2) never to have been named, believing (along with at least several 
others) that one would have been chosen by the presidential nominee 
had he been elected but never finding out because that candidate lost.  
Most would choose the first option, because with the first option the 
potential candidate has been identified as such and thus received a 
fair amount of fame and press attention.  There is an analogy to the 
position of running mate.  Vice-presidential candidate Bob Dole 
would have preferred that he and President Ford had been elected in 
1976.  But merely being on the ticket helped his political fortunes, 
pushing him to a greater level of prominence than he would have 
achieved if he had not been chosen as Ford’s vice-presidential 
running mate.104  The same is true for Sarah Palin, Joe Lieberman, 
Jack Kemp, Geraldine Ferraro, and most every other losing vice-
presidential candidate.105 
 
 104. See Martin Tolchin & Jeff Gerth, The Contradictions of Bob Dole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
1987, § 6, 63 (describing Dole’s televised debate with Walter F. Mondale as the most memorable 
moment of 1976 vice presidential race). 
 105. Some suggest that simply being on Bob Dole’s short list in 1996 (Dole eventually chose 
Jack Kemp) propelled McCain’s career.  See Mark Leibovich, The Great American Float, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2008, at 1 (Week in Review), 5.. 
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That said, neither the presidential candidate nor his announced 
choices will be happy if the candidate puts forward a name with 
skeletons in the closet.  Many aspects of one’s personal life (e.g., 
having sex with prostitutes or soliciting sex in men’s bathrooms) are 
considered fair game, and presidential candidates are going to avoid 
people about whom there might be embarrassing revelations.  This 
will lead to a preference for pre-election nominees who can credibly 
claim to be squeaky clean. 
One way to credibly establish such a claim is for the potential 
nominee or the campaign to hire an independent investigative firm to 
check her background.  But the more obvious solution is for the FBI 
to perform background checks.  The FBI already performs such 
checks for all nominees,106 so this would just move up the time for a 
few of those checks.107  As noted above, pre-election FBI background 
checks would have the added advantage of having the new 
president’s team up and running as soon as possible after the 
election.108 
Beyond that, a potential nominee could credibly claim to be 
squeaky clean based on a different sort of background check—the 
scrutiny that comes from running for office or holding other 
important political positions.  Someone who has recently run for 
office can point out that political opponents and the press extensively 
researched her background and found nothing.  So, insofar as private 
or FBI vetting is unattractive, pre-election selection will tend to favor 
existing politicians.  And, again, pre-election selection will favor 
existing politicians for another reason: presidential candidates will 
want to name people with a significant following (in the hope that 
they are sufficiently popular to bring some persuadable voters to vote 
for the presidential candidate), and people with such a following will 
 
 106. See Gorelick & Gorton, supra note 47. 
 107. Presidential candidates would not need to worry about a hostile administration getting 
information from the FBI.  Such a leak would be a remarkable breach of protocol.  If information 
about an FBI background check were released to the public in advance of an announcement, the 
presidential candidate would (fairly) express his outrage at the administration’s violation of the 
FBI’s processes.  And the charge would likely be effective: people do not like the idea of the FBI 
playing politics.  The hostile administration could try to remove its fingerprints from the leak.  
But, as with the release of unfair attacks, people will attribute the attacks to the party that 
benefits, and will associate that party (naturally enough) with the party’s presidential candidate. 
 108. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.  
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tend to be existing politicians who, not coincidentally, have already 
been subject to much scrutiny. 
One issue lingers: with respect to Supreme Court nominees, 
sitting judges may feel some discomfort.  Maybe these judges would 
find it difficult to make decisions fairly while under such scrutiny.  
We are skeptical, however.  At the outset, we note that it might not 
be so horrible if presidents choose Supreme Court justices from 
outside the pool of sitting judges.  Sitting lower court judges do bring 
with them the experience of having been judges, but the Supreme 
Court is a different entity than the lower courts.  As noted above, 
some commentators believe that we would be better served by 
justices who are drawn from beyond the judiciary.109  There would be 
costs to not being able to draw from the pool of lower court judges, 
but possible benefits too. 
The more important point is that if lower court judges did feel 
discomfort—as they probably should in politically sensitive cases in 
the period of time after their names have been announced by a 
presidential candidate—they could recuse themselves from those 
politically hot cases.  Given that there is already a perceived problem 
with some lower court judges auditioning for the Supreme Court 
through their opinions, it might be good to eliminate that auditioning 
by naming names and inducing recusals. 
Under the current norm, some appellate court judges may shape 
their opinions with an eye toward a presidential candidate’s advisers 
who may be scrutinizing those opinions for the right kinds of 
attitudes.  Naming names in advance should ameliorate that problem.  
It will reduce the number of judges auditioning and will also allow 
(if not force) the chosen ones to recuse themselves from some cases, 
or to take a leave of absence, to avoid the appearance of political 
favoritism.  That transparency seems preferable to the opacity of a 
bunch of judges trying to outdo each other in currying favor with a 
new president. 
D.  Too Much Distraction from the Key Issues  
About the Candidates Themselves 
Would forcing candidates to think hard about whom specifically 
they might want on the Supreme Court (or as their secretary of 
 
 109. See supra text accompanying notes 23–24. 
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defense or treasury) before the election force them to turn their 
attention away from important campaign or policy questions?  The 
answer depends on what a discussion of nominees would displace.  
One only has to look at the sorts of issues that the media choose to 
focus on—and therefore that the candidates have to focus on—in 
campaigns.  Some give us useful information about a president’s 
likely performance and policies (e.g., who has the better health-care 
plan),110 but such discussions are often overwhelmed by endless 
rehashing of supposed gaffes or other ephemera.111  A presidential 
candidate’s naming of possible cabinet or Supreme Court appointees 
would produce at least some discussion about whether the named 
people would be good choices and what this reveals about the likely 
policies of the president’s administration, which with any luck would 
be more illuminating about the president’s likely policies and 
performance in office than whatever it would crowd out.  Given the 
financial crisis that arose in 2008, wouldn’t it have been worthwhile 
for the candidates to compete on who would appoint a better 
secretary of treasury?  Or, given the situation in Iraq, maybe the 
country would have benefited from a competition in the 2008 
election over who the secretaries of defense and state would be. 
Our proposal does push the electoral considerations slightly 
toward a focus on a presidential candidate’s team.  But, given the 
importance of cabinet members and Supreme Court justices, such a 
move seems appropriate.  And, significantly, the media and voters 
already pay a lot of attention to people who are perceived as 
reflecting on the presidential candidate’s judgment—in this past 
election cycle preachers have loomed large,112 and to a lesser extent 
 
 110. See, e.g., Margaret Talev & William Douglas, Obama and McCain Bring Health-Care 
Fight to Red States, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2008, available at http://www.adn.com/ 
3046/story/575813.html. 
 111. See, e.g., Paul Hitlin et al., Gaffes Drove the Campaign Narrative Last Week, 
JOURNALISM.ORG, http://journalism.org/node/11881 (providing an overview of the 2008 
Presidential Campaign for the week of July 7–13, noting a high level of coverage on gaffes and 
anticipating that coverage will continue to be dominated by such gaffes). 
 112. E.g., Charles Krauthhammer, A Question of Barack Obama’s Character, 
REALCLEARPOLITICS, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/10/obamas_ 
character_still_questio.html (discussing Obama’s ties with Reverend Jeremiah Wright); Brian 
Todd et al., McCain Rejects Minster’s Endorsement, CNN.COM http://www.cnn.com/2008/ 
POLITICS/05/22/mccain.hagee/index.html (noting the controversy over John Hagee’s and Rod 
Parsley’s endorsements of John McCain, and McCain’s decision to reject both endorsements). 
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the tactics and lobbying ties of top campaign officials.113  This 
highlights that voters are often interested in the people around a 
president.  Even casual sports fans usually know something about 
more than one player on a given team, so it is not surprising that 
voters have some interest in a presidential candidate’s team.114  As 
long as the media and voters are going to be interested in people who 
seem to reflect on a candidate, it will be in a candidate’s—and 
society’s—interest for at least some of that focus to shift toward the 
people who will be making important decisions.  Cabinet officials 
and Supreme Court justices will be at the top of that list.115 
We recognize the argument that the presidential race should be 
about the candidate’s character, his family values, his spouse’s 
family values, and so on.  Our proposal would distract from that—for 
which we make no apologies. 
E.  Reducing the Incentives to Work on the  
Candidates’ Campaigns 
The claim underlying this argument is that many of those who 
work on presidential campaigns or contribute money do so in the 
hope of being rewarded with positions in the administration.  The 
competition among these campaigners is most intense for the most 
prestigious positions, such as judgeships, cabinet positions, and 
ambassadorships.  Sometimes, the person doing the campaigning is 
 
 113. E.g., Ken Dilenian, Obama’s Claim of Independence Questioned, USATODAY.COM, 
Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-04-15-obamainside_ 
N.htm (discussing Obama’s ties to law firms, state lobbyists, and corporate executives); 
Menachem Rosensaft, Meet John McCain’s Pals, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 20, 2008, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/menachem-rosensaft/meet-john-mccains-pals_b_136085.html 
(discussing McCain’s ties with Phil Gramm and Charles Black). 
 114. As a comparative matter, the average voter will likely know far more about the starting 
players on their favorite team than they will know about any of the people on a candidate’s team 
(and maybe the candidate himself), but as an absolute matter many voters will still have interest 
in a presidential candidate’s team.  
 115. What if McCain had said that the economy was in shambles and that he was going to ask 
Robert Rubin and Larry Summers to come back to run things on the financial front?  Maybe 
Obama would have countered with someone better.  Or maybe he would have said that he also 
would ask Rubin and Summers.  That way—assuming the electorate agreed that the Rubin-
Summers combination would be optimal—we might have had effective financial policy 
regardless of who was elected.  One can spin out a similar story for the Supreme Court.  If the 
candidates were to compete and there was a clearly optimal nonpartisan solution that the populace 
preferred—maybe a modern version of Learned Hand or Henry Friendly (neither of whom ever 
got on to the High Court)—we might even get a situation where the candidates would end up 
being forced to agree on the same candidate.  The candidates would not like this because it would 
reduce their ability to pay back political favors.  But the electorate would be better off. 
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not seeking the appointment for herself but wants input on whom the 
president selects.  The incentive effects on behavior are the same, 
though.  There is a tournament of sorts among supporters, rewarding 
those who do the most with appointments or the power to influence 
appointments.  If candidates are forced to name names in the pre-
election context, this will reduce the incentives for supporters to 
work hard since they will now know who will be receiving positions 
and who will not. 
We have no quarrel with the foregoing; it strikes us as an 
accurate portrayal of incentives.  Yes, there will be fewer incentives 
to work hard on a campaign for those who are hoping to leverage 
their work into an appointment.  And that will make it more difficult 
for the candidates to run their campaigns.  Maybe candidates will end 
up having to work harder on fundraising.  But is there a net social 
loss?  Reducing the candidates’ ability to use the prospect of future 
appointments as a carrot to induce effort from campaign staff 
increases social value in that having fewer patronage-based 
appointments should result in better-quality appointments overall.116 
VI.  CONCLUSION: WORTH MOVING  
BEYOND THE STATUS QUO? 
In light of the above, and dozens of other objections that we 
have not anticipated, would it be a good idea for the rules of the 
presidential election game to be changed—to push candidates to give 
specific answers about who their nominees for cabinet and Court 
positions will be?  There are potential downsides.  The candidates 
might refuse to answer the questions.  Or there might be large-scale 
capture by interest groups.  We believe, however, that the odds are in 
our favor that inducing greater competition over the names of 
prospective nominees will yield improvement over the status quo. 
The gains would flow from forcing information out of the 
candidates.  Voters would have more information in two ways.  First, 
 
 116. A related objection is that the election process, where various contenders for 
appointments compete to show the presidential candidate which of them is more loyal and 
capable (e.g., by demonstrating good or bad judgment in what they say to the press), supplies 
useful information to presidential candidates.  But characteristics like loyalty and judgment will 
likely have been demonstrated for months (if not years) before, and any additional seeming 
increment of those characteristics shown during the campaign may not reveal accurate 
information.  Anyone can put on a good show for a couple of months, if the incentive is a top spot 
in a new administration. 
  
Winter 2009] MR. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE 333 
the public would know who key members of an administration would 
be.  The public could evaluate the president’s choices, rather than 
guess about them based on reports of whom the president seemed to 
favor or who worked tirelessly on his campaign.  Second, the identity 
of those nominees would provide information about the other people 
that the president might appoint, and more generally about the sorts 
of policies that the president might pursue.  Naming names is a 
costly signal—and costly signals yield more information than does 
cheap talk.  This information will be particularly valuable for 
presidential candidates whose prior public careers have been fairly 
short, which describes a good percentage of recent presidents.117  
More broadly, the choices made would give us important information 
about the potential president.  Is he willing to take risks by 
nominating potentially controversial candidates?  Does he choose 
people with lots of government experience or outsiders?  Does he 
seem more comfortable with people of a certain temperament? 
And while we have nothing against discussions of the trivial—
we like political gossip as much as the next person—naming names 
would allow for more substantive and informative news stories about 
the candidate’s people, and with any luck would reduce the space 
devoted to pure fluff.  In each of the last two presidential races the 
New York Times saw fit to devote front-page space to an article about 
the person who carries the Democratic nominee’s snacks.118  These 
gentlemen seem like nice people,119 but does the public gain insight 
into the likely policies of a President Kerry by learning that he likes 
peanut butter and jelly sandwiches, or the policies of a President 
Obama by finding out that he likes Met-Rx protein bars?  More 
useful would be profiles of the people that a candidate was actually 
going to choose for policy positions.  Such profiles are not terribly 
useful when many names are bandied about; these discussions have 
 
 117. Eisenhower had no previous experience as an elected official; Kennedy had a fairly short 
legislative career prior to his presidency; Carter had a single term as Governor of Georgia; 
George W. Bush had a term and a half as Governor of Texas. 
 118. See Ashley Parker, On the Court and on the Trail, One Aide Looms Over Obama, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 27, 2008, at A1 (profiling Reggie Love, Barack Obama’s “body man,” who says that 
his job is to “Take. Care. Of. Stuff,” for example procuring Met-Rx protein bars for Obama); Jodi 
Wilgoren, Part Butler and Part Buddy, Aide Keeps Kerry Running, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2004, 
at A1 (profiling Marvin Nicholson, John Kerry’s “body man” who is identified as the “chief of 
stuff”—for example procuring peanut butter and jelly sandwiches for Kerry). 
 119. One of the authors has met both and can attest that they seem quite likable. 
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at most a snippet about each of the people who might be a prominent 
cabinet member or a Supreme Court justice.  And the discussions 
often spend a fair amount of time speculating about whose star is 
ascending and whose is falling.  Such guesswork can make for a 
parlor game, but its value is limited.  By contrast, if we had actual 
names, then we could learn more about them and as a result learn 
about the policies that the administration would likely pursue. 
Ultimately, the desirability of a competition over names is in the 
eye of the beholder.  But note a broader dispositional factor that 
looms large: one’s attitude toward change.  For those wary of 
change, our proposal will be anathema.  For those sympathetic to it, 
it may be welcome.  It likely comes down to your sympathy for 
Edmund Burke versus your sympathy for a quotation made famous 
by Ronald Reagan: “Status quo, you know, that is Latin for the mess 
we’re in.”120 
 
 
 120. See President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a Reception for Members of the Associated 
General Contractors of America (Mar. 16, 1981), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ 
archives/speeches/1981/31681c.htm. 
